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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Darrell Wyatt Morris appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of 
his petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, he challenges the district 
court's denial of his motion to appoint counsel. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts of Morris' underlying 
convictions: 
Morris appeals from the judgments of conviction in two cases that 
were consolidated for purposes of sentencing . In case number 
35541 , Morris was charged with eluding a police officer, I.C. § 49-
1401 (2)(a), and pursuant to a plea agreement, pied guilty to the 
charge and the state agreed to dismiss a separate case and to 
remand yet another case as a misdemeanor. While awaiting 
sentencing on the eluding charge, Morris was charged with and 
pied guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), I.C. §§ 
18-8004, 18-8005(5), in case number 35542. The district court 
sentenced Morris to a unified term of five years , with three years 
determinate, on the eluding charge and to a consecutive unified 
term of ten years , with three years determinate, on the DUI . Morris 
filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence in 
case number 35542 , which the district court denied. Morris 
appeals from his judgments of conviction and sentences, 
contending that the district court abused its discretion by failing to 
consider his mental illness and alternatively by imposing excessive 
sentences. 
State v. Morris, Docket Nos. 35541 /35542 , 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 482 
(Idaho App., May 29, 2009), pp.1-2 . The Court affirmed Morris's convictions and 
sentences. Id. 
Morris timely filed a pro se "Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction 
Relief." (R., pp .3-6.) Morris asserted that he received ineffective assistance of 
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counsel at sentencing, claiming his counsel failed to effectively present mitigating 
factors and to "object to objectable issues," and also promised Morris that his 
cases would be transferred to Mental Health Court and he would be placed on 
probation . (R., pp .4-5 .) 
The district court denied Morris's motion for counsel and issued notice of 
its intent to dismiss Morris's petition . (R., pp.16-19.) After setting forth the 
standard for appointment of post-conviction counsel articulated in Charboneau v. 
State, 140 Idaho 789, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004) , and the standard for evaluating an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim as articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984), the district court found that Morris's claims "are so patently 
frivolous that they could not be developed into viable claims even with the 
assistance of counsel." (R., p.18.) Specifically , the district court found that 
Morris had "fail[ed) to describe any such evidence or objections [that counsel 
failed to present or make]; nor [did) he show how he was prejudiced or how this 
evidence would have resulted in a different outcome. Petitioner's vague and 
unsupported statements and incomplete claims do not form the basis for a 
cognizable claim for post conviction relief." (R., p.17 (internal citations omitted).) 
The district court gave Morris twenty days "to correct the deficiencies in his 
claims." (Id.) 
Morris's response did not include any affidavits or other admissible 
evidence. (R., pp.25-32.) Morris did, however, "attempt to expound on his 
following allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel." (R., p.26.) 
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Specifically, for purposes of the instant appeal, Morris expounded on his claim 
that his trial counsel "did not object to objectable issues": 
Counsel did not object to the Court's Mental Health Evaluation 
because of the fact it was administered by a Department of Health 
and Welfare "counselor" during a twenty (20) minute visit at the 
County Jail, and not a licensed physician. 
(R., p.27.) Morris also claimed that his trial counsel did not submit for sentencing 
"several medical reports and record from the Social Security Administration, All 
Seasons Mental Health, lntermountain Hospital, and Saint Alphonsus Mental 
Health Center which ... would [have] contradicted the Court's Mental Health 
Evaluation." (Id.) As to his prejudice, Morris argued "[h]ad this honorable Court 
known of the Petitioner's true mental health history, it would [have] had to 
consider that as well," and "could have considered treatment and rehabilitation 
instead of only incarceration." (Id.) 
Upon the state's motion (R., pp.33-34), the district court issued its "Order 
Unsealing and Authorizing Release of Presentence Investigation Report and I.C. 
§ 19-2524 Evaluations" (R., pp.35-36). The district court also granted Morris's 
"Motion to Unseal and Release All Medical Reports in Cases CR-MD-2008-
001589 and CR-FE-2008-00077 41," by which Morris sought the release of his 
medical records by his trial counsel and which, he claimed, were not provided to 
the court at sentencing. (R., pp.37-38, 39.) 
In the same order by which it granted Morris's request for the release of 
his medical records, the district court considered Morris's response to its 
previous order denying counsel and notice of intent to dismiss Morris's petition. 
(R., pp.39-44 ("Order Denying Counsel and Notice of Intent to Dismiss").) 
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The district court addressed Morris's first claim, that his trial counsel failed 
to provide the sentencing court wrth his medical records from the Social Security 
Administration, All Seasons Mental Health, lntermountain Hospital and Saint 
Alphonsus Mental Health Center. (R., pp.39-40.) The district court reviewed the 
record below and noted: 
[T]he file clearly shows that the Court reviewed multiple mental 
health related reports, including those listed by the Petitioner, and 
took them into consideration prior to sentencing, including: 
Discharge Summary from Vista Del Mar Hospital; Omega Health 
Services Psychiatric Progress Notes; All Seasons Mental Health 
Summary and Comprehensive Assessment; lntermountain Hospital 
Discharge Summary, History and Physical, and Psychiatric 
Evaluation; Saint Alphonsus Emergency Room Reports, Operative 
Reports, Patient's Charts, Emergency Mental Health Consultation 
Report, Radiology Reports, Inpatient Psychosocial Assessment, 
Inpatient Progress Notes, and Patient Profile Report; Ada County 
Paramedics Prehospital Patient Care Report; June 19, 2008 Mental 
Health Report (I.C. § 19-2524); July 16, 2008 Substance Abuse 
Report (I.C. § 19-2524). 
(R., p.40.) Accordingly, the district court found Morris's claim that his trial 
counsel failed to provide these reports to the sentencing court was "clearly 
contradicted by the record." (Id.) "As such, the Court finds these allegations 
remain patently frivolous and fail to warrant the appointment of counsel." (Id.) 
The district court then addressed Morris's second claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel: 
As to allegation two (2), that "counsel did not object to objectable 
[sic] issues," Petitioner alleges (a) counsel failed to object to the 
Mental Health Evaluation because it was not administered by a 
licensed physician; and (b) counsel did not rebut the evaluation 
with the contradictory medical reports. This second supportive 
allegation is merely repetitive of Petitioner's first allegation and will 
not be further addressed. As to the allegation that counsel failed to 
object to the lack of a physician, this claim remains incomplete. 
"Effective legal representation does not require that an attorney 
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object to admissible evidence." Counsel had no reasonable 
grounds on which to object. In Thorgaard v. State, the petitioner 
sought relief based on an allegation that the staff psychologist was 
not qualified to conduct the evaluation. However, [Thorgaard] 
failed to show any error or inadequacy in the clinician's report, thus 
failing to establish his burden of prejudice. Moreover, Petitioner 
has neither alleged nor shown that the evaluation violated the 
requirements of I.C. § 19-2524 or similar provisions. 
Accordingly, because this claim ... is clearly contradicted by the 
record, and because it is facially invalid, this claim remains 
incomplete and patently frivolous. 
(R. pp.40-41 (citations omitted).) The district court then considered Morris's third 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that trial counsel had promised he 
would be placed on probation and his cases transferred to mental health court, 
and determined that these claims, too, were contradicted by the record of the 
change of plea hearing. (R., pp.41-42.) Finally, the district court found that 
Morris's claim that he was unable to meaningfully participate in the proceedings 
due to "the influence of mood stabilizing medications" was also contradicted by 
the record. (R., p.42.) 
Concluding that it "again finds Petitioner's claims are so patently frivolous 
that they could not be developed into viable claims even with the assistance of 
counsel," the district court denied Morris's request for post-conviction counsel, 
and gave Morris an additional twenty (20) days to respond to avoid dismissal of 
his petition. (R., pp.42-43.) More than four months later, having received no 
response from Morris, the district court dismissed Morris's petition for post-
conviction relief. (R., pp.45-48.) Morris timely appealed. (R., pp.49-52.) 
5 
ISSUE 
Morris states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Morris' motion for 
appointment of post-conviction counsel? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as: 
Has Morris failed to show error in the denial of his motion for the appointment of 
post-conviction counsef? 
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ARGUMENT 
Morris Has Failed to Show That the District Court Erred By Denying His Request 
For Post-Conviction Counsel 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, Morris challenges only the district court's conclusion that he 
did not raise the possibility of a valid claim with respect to his second claim, that 
counsel failed to object to the mental health evaluation being conducted by a 
counselor with the Department of Health and Welfare "and not a licensed 
physician." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Morris contends that the district court 
committed reversible error when it denied his motion for post-conviction counsel 
because, he claims, he raised the possibility of a valid claim that counsel should 
have objected to the mental health evaluation ordered pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524 
on grounds that it did not comply with the requirements for a presentence 
psychological evaluation ordered pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.9-10.) Application of the law to the facts before the district court, however, 
supports its determination that Morris's petition and argument failed to establish 
even the possibility of a valid claim. Morris has therefore failed to show that the 
district court erred when it denied his motion for counsel. 
B. Standard Of Review And Legal Standards Applicable To A District Court's 
Decision To Grant Or Deny A Request For The Appointment Of Counsel 
In Post-Conviction Proceedings 
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is 
governed by I.C. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or deny a request for court-
appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. 
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State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Hust v. State, 147 
Idaho 682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009). 1 The court's discretion is 
not unfettered, however. If the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges facts 
showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on 
the defendant's behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction counsel to assist 
the petitioner in developing his or her claims. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 
654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. 
If, on the other hand, the claims in the petition are so patently frivolous that there 
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with 
1 Morris recognizes that the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the 
standard of review applicable to a district court's decision to grant or deny post-
conviction counsel is one of an abuse of discretion. (Appellant's brief, p.6.) He 
argues, however, that "the 'possibility of a valid claim' standard that was coined 
in Charboneau and reiterated in Swader is a strictly legal standard that leaves no 
room for the district court to exercise its discretion" and, as such, "any decision 
by a district court to deny a post-conviction petitioner counsel must be reviewed 
de nova on appeal." (Id., pp.7-8 (citation omitted).) The state acknowledges 
that, despite the legislature's use of the word "may" in I.C. § 19-4904, see also 
1993 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 265, § 2, p.898 (changing "shall" to "may"), the 
Idaho appellate courts have treated the standard for appointment of counsel as a 
pure question of law instead of discretion. See, ~. Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 
339, 343, 223 P.3d 281, 285 (2009) (district court's failure to rule on request for 
counsel did not necessitate reversal because the successive petition did not 
raise the possibility of a valid claim); Swader, 143 Idaho at 653, 152 P.3d at 14 
(question when district court fails to apply the correct legal standard governing 
the request for appointed counsel is whether, applying the correct legal standard, 
the motion for appointment of counsel should have been granted); Judd v. State, 
148 Idaho 22, 25, 218 P.3d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted) (district 
court's utilization of incorrect legal standard to deny a request for post-conviction 
counsel does not necessitate reversal if, applying the correct standard, the 
request for counsel would properly be denied). The state submits, however, that 
whether the district court's decision in this case is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion or de nova, the ultimate inquiry is still the same, i.e., whether Morris 
alleged facts showing the "possibility of valid claim." 
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the assistance of counsel and further investigation, the court may deny the 
request for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing 
meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 
P.3d 798, 809 (2007). 
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of 
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904 "permits the trial court to 
determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of 
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the 
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot 
be expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 
140 Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. In reviewing the denial of a motion 
for appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t)his Court will not 
set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to 
questions of law, this Court exercises free review." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 
676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001), quoted in Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 
102 P.3d at 1111. 
C. Morris Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In The Denial Of His 
Request For Counsel To Pursue The Frivolous Claims Alleged In His 
Petition 
Morris contended that counsel did not object to the mental health 
evaluation being administered by a counselor with the Department of Health and 
Welfare. (R., p.27.) After correctly noting that "[e)ffective legal representation 
does not require that an attorney object to admissible evidence," State v. 
Aspeytia, 130 Idaho 12, 15, 936 P.2d 210, 213 (Ct. App. 1997), the district court 
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found that Morris "has neither alleged nor shown that the evaluation violated the 
requirements of I .C. § 19-2524 or similar provisions." (R., p.41.) The district 
court also analogized this case to Thorgaard v. State, 125 Idaho 901, 905, 876 
P.2d 599, 603 (Ct. App. 1994), where the "petitioner failed to show any error or 
inadequacy in the clinician's report, thus failing to establish his burden of 
prejudice." (R., p.41.) The district court's ultimate conclusion that Morris's 
contention did not raise the possibility of a valid claim is correct. 
The mental health evaluation was ordered by the district court pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2524. (See Supreme Court Case Nos. 35541 and 35542: "Mental 
Health Report Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-2524," attached to Addendum 
to Presentence Report dated 7/14/2008; Sent. Tr., p.11, Ls.12-20; 6/19/08 Chg. 
Plea Tr., p.7, Ls.6-13, p.8, Ls.10-13, p.14, L.23- p.15, L.4, p.21, Ls.5-8.2) I.C. § 
19-2524 does not contain any explicit requirements for the qualifications of the 
persons conducting either the substance abuse assessment or mental health 
examination described therein; therefore a challenge to the clinician from the 
Department of Health and Welfare would be without any basis. The district 
court's conclusion that Morris did not raise the possibility of a valid claim is 
therefore correct. 
Morris appears to claim on appeal that I C. § 19-2522 requires that a 
mental health evaluation conducted pursuant to LC. § 19-2524 comply with the 
requirements for a psychological evaluation conducted pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2522. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) Because this conclusion is unsupported by 
2 A Motion to Take Judicial Notice is being filed contemporaneously with this brief. 
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any argument or authority, Morris has waived this claim on appeal and the Court 
should decline to consider it. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 
970 (1996). More importantly, nothing in either statute gives rise to the 
conclusion that the requirements for a psychological evaluation conducted 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 should be applied to a mental health evaluation 
conducted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524. To the contrary, the statutes make clear 
that an evaluation conducted pursuant to I. C. § 19-2524 is not subject to the 
more stringent requirements of I.C. § 19-2522. 
First, I.C. § 19-2524 contains no explicit requirements for the qualifications 
of the persons conducting either the substance abuse assessment or mental 
health examination described therein. Second, I.C. § 19-2524(3)(b) provides 
that if, after receiving the ordered mental health evaluation, the court determines 
that it requires more information, the court may then order a second evaluation, 
this one "to be furnished by a psychiatrist, licensed physician or licensed 
psychologist." Finally, the language of I.C. § 19-2524(6) at least implicitly 
indicates that the evaluations conducted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524 may be 
conducted by the Department of Health and Welfare, as the costs of any 
assessments and examinations, "including any evaluation ... shall be borne by 
the department." In sum, the language of I.C. § 19-2524 contains no explicit 
qualifications for the personnel conducting a mental health evaluation, and 
contains language implying that that an evaluation conducted by a psychiatrist, 
licensed physician or licensed psychologist is only required if the court orders 
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additional evaluation after having considered the mental health examination 
contemplated by I.C. § 19-2524. 
Morris alleged no facts showing counsel performed deficiently for not 
objecting because the evaluation was by a clinician instead of a psychiatrist or 
psychologist. He likewise presented no evidence that an evaluation by a 
psychiatrist or psychologist instead of the clinician would have changed the 
outcome of sentencing. Morris has therefore failed to show that he raised the 
possibility of a valid claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that required 
the assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings. He has thus failed to 
show that the district court erred when it denied his motion for the appointment of 
counsel. This Court should affirm the district court's order summarily dismissing 
Morris's petition for post-conviction relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully asks this Court to affirm the district court's summary 
dismissal of Morris's petition for post-conviction relief, including the district 
court's order denying Morris's motion for post-conviction counsel. 
DATED this 24th day of August, 201< 
// 
/ /Re ekah A. Cude 
(/ Deputy Attorney General 
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